Abstract. We propose an access control scheme for developing authorization rules for XML documents, allowing flexible data granularity and authorization propagation. To simplify the complex access control policies in XML, we introduce a new tool: Authorization Policy Sheet (APS). Complex access control rules can be easily described in an APS. The administrator of a system can easily manage the access control of the system. With aid of Data Type Definitions(DTD), the policies given in an APS can be converted into a standard XML code that can be implemented in a normal XML environment.
Introduction
Using eXtensible Markup Language has brought profound changes in the nature of information and the usability of the Web. XML can conveniently represent document structure and contents and offers great control over information granularity via transformation and query languages. As XML becomes a widespread data encoding format for Web applications, the Web resource protection must follow to withstand increasing threats from Internet hackers.
One important mechanism to protect Web contents is Access Control. An access control service is needed when some people want to block or allow access to an entire XML instance, while others would like to control access at the tag level. Developing an access control model, and related mechanism, in terms of XML is an important step. With the rapid development of web environments XML data access control has been intensively studied (e.g., [2, 8, 4, 5, 3, 1, 7] ). However, these existing research works on XML do not offer more advanced access control features such as authorization delegation and propagation.
The popular mechanism in XML based access control takes advantage of Data Type Definitions (DTD) (e.g., [1] ). With a DTD based approach, the access control rules are defined in DTD. A DTD based approach is sometimes employed along with a customized XML access control language where the rules are described using the language [6] . The merit of this kind of scheme is that the system administrator can enter/update access control rules much more conveniently.
In practice, access control components come with an order. For example, an order could be: super user > group member > others, where super user holds the highest privilege and others hold the least privilege. In objects, an order can be associated with the depth the objects reside in a tree or a directory. Access control in such systems implies the propagation of authorization in terms of the associated order. In this paper, we present a novel framework for fine grain XML access control that includes delegation and propagation of authorization, in terms of the partial order of access control components. With our scheme, the complicated assess control task in XML documents becomes easy, since we propose a novel access control "spreadsheet" tool for describing rules. We call it Authorization Policy Sheet (APS). Using an APS with the associated DTD forms a normal XML code that is understandable to a normal XML environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our access control model and define the major components in our model. In Section 3, we present the authorization policy sheet (APS), which forms the foundation to our model. In Section 4, we provide the definitions of predicates. In Section 4, we introduce the authorization propagation. The final section is the conclusion.
Basic Definitions
In this section, we define our access control model. We give the definitions of DTD, APS, and associated system components including subjects, objects, authorization rights, and types.
Document Type Definition (DTD)
A Document Type Declaration can be attached to XML file and specifies the rules or Document Type Definition (DTD) that XML file may follow. A DTD consists of two parts: the element declarations and the attributions. The element declarations part specifies the structure of the elements contained in the document. The attribute list declarations part specifies the list of its attributes, in terms of names, types, optionally clause, and default values.
Subject
A subject is active. It could be a user or a processor. A subject has a name and other associated information dependent on the application. We require subjects to be either ordered with a proper order or unordered when the order of subjects are insignificant.
Subject Set. Subject constant poset (S, >): admin, s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n denote ordered subjects with the order of admin > s 1 > s 2 > · · · > s n . We assume that the administrator possesses the highest privilege.
A subject can be defined according to the need. For example, a subject could be described by set of attributes such as name, address, rights, etc. As the simplest example, in DTD, the subject is defined as:
The attribute to the above subject set contains only the usernames.
Here is the example of the subject hierarchy with three subjects (Admin, Alice, Bob), described in a separate sheet: <subject> <users> <name> Admin </name> </users> <users> <name> Alice </name> </users> <users> <name> Bob </name> </users> </subject>
We have omitted "partial order" of the associated subjects such as Admin > Bob > Alice as this will be presented later on.
Object Objects are passive. They could be files, programs, tables, etc. Objects are represented by a constant poset (O,>): o 1 , o 2 , · · · with the order o 1 > o 2 , > ... The object is described as target + path(V, E), where target is an XML document or URL address, path is an XPath expression that eventually selects specific portions (object) of the XML document in the XML tree where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges. The structure of the objects could be defined in the DTD as follows.
Here is the example of the object hierarchy described in a separate XML sheet: <object> <object> <target> hospital.xml </target> <path>//doctor/operation_info</path> </object> <object> <target> hospital.xml </target> <path>//doctor/personnel_info/alice </path> </object> </object> Access Rights Ordered access rights are defined as constant poset (A, >): a 1 , a 2 , · · · with the order: a 1 > a 2 > ... For example, Read > Write > Executable. They are defined in DTD as follows.
Authorization Type Authorization type is given by the constant set T = {n, p, d}, where -n: the access right is forbidden.
-p: specifies the access right is granted.
-d: specifies the access right is delegable.
The ordered authorization types are described in DTD:
Authorization Policy Sheet
Directly using XML to describe access control often shows little advantage when the access control system is complicated (e.g., when authorization delegation and propagation are required). In our model, authorization specifications or rules are provided in an Authorization Policy Sheet (APS) associated with the document/DTD. In APS, the representation of authorizations is described in terms of 1. Orders of the objects and subjects, 2. Explicit authorization rules.
The APS is separate from the document and DTD and offers great convenience in the administration of access control for system administrators due to its simplicity. The system administrator can manage the system access control by the concise rules given in an APS. The resultant XML sheet can be generated from the corresponding DTD and APS. APS also shows the great advantage due to its convenience in the specification of explicit rights and the implicit rights for XML documents.
Rules
An APS sheet consists of a finite set of rules. A rule consists of name, head and attribute. When the head of a rule is an authorization predicate, the rule is called authorization rule. For a set of rules named r, each rule consists of a predicate and an attribute:
<rule:r> <p1, attribute> <-<condition> <p2, attribute> <-<condition> <p3, attribute> <-<condition> <pn, attribute> <-<condition> </rule:r> Here, p1, p2,...,pn are a set of predicates and attribute denotes the components associated with the predicate. condition denotes the condition with respect to the rule of a predicate. Due to the space limit, we will omit the details in this paper and will present it in the full version of the paper.
The structure of rule in DTD is defined as following:
A rule in XML is defined as following:
<rule:r> <predicate,attribute, ...,attribute> ... <condition> ... </condition> </rule:r>
Partial Order
The partial orders of the access control components, including subjects, object, types, and rights, are one of the key components in an APS. We will see that they can be used to simplify our access control system by implicit rules in authorization propagations. In an APS, the partial orders are respectively defined in the form:
Predicates form the essential part of an APS. In our system, there is a set of predicates:
Every predicate is constructed in the form < p i , x 1 , ...., x n >. x 1 , ..., x n are terms associated with the predicate. We utilize following predicates in an APS.
grant

Definition 1. (grant) grant is a 6-tuple predicate S × O × T × A × S × F :
< grant, s, o, t, a, g, f >, where subject s ∈ S is granted by grantor g ∈ G the access right a ∈ A on object o ∈ O with the type t ∈ T . It determines whether a subject is granted an access right over an object. In an APS, this rule reads: <grant grantee=" ", target+path=" ", authorization_type=" ", access_right=" ", grantor=" ", status=" "> Predicate grant in APS is an authorization rule, where the element grant has attributes grantee; target + path(V, E), target is an XML or DTD, path is an XPath expression that eventually selects specific portions (object) of the XML document in XML tree where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges, authorization type, access rights, grantor, and status. status is a flag indicating whether or not the rule is effective.
For example,
The merit of grant in ASP is obvious. The grant is also defined in DTD as follows.
<!DOCTYPE grant[ <!ELEMENT grant (subject,object,authorization_type, access_right,subject,status)> <!ELEMENT subject (grantee)> <!ELEMENT grantee (name)> <!ELEMENT name #PCDATA> <!ELEMENT object (target,path)> <!ELEMENT target href #PCDATA> <!ELEMENT path #PCDATA>
The grant rule defined in ASP and DTD is converted into a standard form of XML. Here is an example of grant in APS and XML:
-rule in APS:
<rule:hospital> <grant, grantee="Alice", target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/", authorization_type="p", access_right="Read", grantor="Bob", status="True"> </rule:hospital> -rule converted to XML: <rule:hospital> <grant> <subject> <grantee> <name> Alice </name> </grantee> </subject> <object> <target>hospital_info.xml </target> <path>//hospital/operation_info</path> </object> <type> p </type> <access_right> Read </access_right> <subject> <grantor> <name> Bob </name> </grantor> </subject> <status> True </status> </grant> </rule:hospital> which reads that the grantee Alice is granted by the grantor Bob the access right read on Xpath specified object hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/ with the authorization type p and the status is set to True.
cangrant
Differing from grant, the predicate cangrant represents the capability of a subject in granting a right with respect to an object to another subject. Formally, we define it as follow.
Definition 2. (cangrant)
cangrant is a 4-tuple predicate S × O × A × F : < cangrant, s, o, a, f > where s ∈ S is the grantor; o ∈ O = target + path(V, E), target is an XML or DTD, path is an XPath expression that eventually selects specific portions (object) of the XML document in XML tree, V is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges; a ∈ A is an access right; and f ∈ F is the status of the rule. cangrant determines whether a subject can grant an access right over an object.
The definition above states that Subject s has the right to grant access right a on object o to other subjects.
In APS, we define the cangrant as <cangrant subject,target+path,access_right,status>
In DTD, cangrant is defined as follows:
The following is an example of cangrant in XML.
<rule:hospital> <cangrant subject="Alice", target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info", access_right="Read", status="True"> </rule:hospital> -rule converted to XML: <rule:hospital> <cangrant> <subject> <grantee> <name> Alice </name> </grantee> </subject> <object> <target> * </target> <path>//hospital/operation_info</path> </object> <access_right> Read </access_right> <status> True </status> </cangrant> </rule:hospital> This rule states that Alice can grant the right read with respect to the object //hospital_info + //hospital/operation_info to other subjects.
Delegation
We define the delegation right d, which allows a subject who holds an access right to grant the right to another subject. A subject can grant other subjects an access right a over object o if the subject has an associated cangrant right and -s is the security administrator admin, or -s has been granted a over o with delegable type d.
Clearly, the type d is a flag indicating whether or not the access right can be further granted to another subject by the holder of the access right.
We also assume that if subject s receives a delegable authorization directly or indirectly from another subject s on some object o and access right a, then s cannot grant s authorization on the same o and a later on.
For example, Alice is granted an access right Read|Write of type p|d over object hospital info.xml + //hospital/operation info/, then we have -rule in APS:
<rule:hospital> <grant, grantee="Alice", target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/", authorization_type="p|d", access_right="Read|Write", grantor="Bob", status="True"> </rule:hospital> This rule implies that Alice can grant the access right with respect to o and a to another subject. In other words, the list of rules can be updated whenever Alice takes the action.
With rule:hospital and cangrant right, <cangrant,subject="Alice", target+path="hospital_info + *", access_right="Read", status="True">
A new rule can be generated by Alice (notice that Write access is forbidden):
<rule:hospital2> <grant, grantee="Cindy", target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/", authorization_type="p", access_right="Read", grantor="Alice", status="True"> </rule:hospital2> where we have assumed that d denotes the non-inherited delegation. This means that the delegatee Bob cannot further delegate the right to other parties. To allow further delegation, we use the flag d+. If we replace d with d+, then we have <rule:hospital2> <grant, grantee="Cindy", target+path="hospital_info.xml + //hospital/operation_info/", authorization_type="p|d", access_right="Read", grantor="Alice", status="True"> </rule:hospital2>
Thus, the access right is delegated to Cindy, who can then grant it to another party.
Authorization Propagation
Our model supports the implicit authorizations by permitting rules propagation. A rule based authorization specification allows implicit authorizations to be derived from the given authorization set. In APS, we give an explicit authorization set and they will derive implicit rules automatically by propagation. Using authorization propagation can greatly reduce the size of an authorization set.
Let S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S n be n sets of subjects and O 1 , O 2 , · · · , O m be m sets of objects. As we have described earlier about the partial order of our system, subjects in S i , objects in O i , and authorization rights satisfy the partial order rule. The authorization propagation is based on the partial order rule.
In a set S i , the access right held by a subject with a lower order propagates to the subjects with a higher order. For instance, in S i , Alice has the order of 2, Bob has the order of 3, and the administrator has the order of 1; that is, Administrator > Bob > Alice. If Alice can read the object o 1 , then by authorization propagation Bob and administrator can also read o 1 . If Bob can read the object o 2 , then Alice cannot read o 2 unless the administrator or Bob grants the read access right to her. The administrator possesses the access right of Alice and Bob by propagation.
For an object set O i , the authorization associated with objects with a lower order propagates to the object with a higher order. For instance, the descendant of a node can be read by an user, then the node can also be read by this user. Assuming //operation/files/patient is the object set with the partial order operation > files > patient. If a subject who can read on patient can also read files and operation by propagation.
For an access right set A with the partial order a 1 > a 2 > · · ·, if a subject holds the access right with a higher order implies that it has the access rights with a lower order. For instance, for a 1 = Write and a 2 = Read, if the subject s 1 has Write access to an object o 1 , the then s 1 also has the Read access to o 1 .
